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“WE NEED THIS TELEVISION JUST LIKE ANY OTHER AMERICAN CITIZEN”:
THE BATTLE OVER WESTERN TV BOOSTERS, 1952-1961
Thanksgiving Day, 1957, was cold and blustery in the small mining enclave of
Breckinridge, Colorado. A dusting of snow had fallen the night before, but by the afternoon
the town was in the throes of a full-fledged blizzard and roads were soon impassable. Mayor
Frank Brown gave up trying to keep pace with shoveling his driveway and instead settled in
to watch college football on Denver’s KOA-TV. He ended up spending the rest of the day in
his living room with his feet hoisted up, watching KOA until it signed off for the evening.
“[I] lived the life of Riley,” Brown maintained, “just like the other 160 million Americans do
when the weather is bad.” His enthusiasm was based in no small part on the fact that this was
the first year that he and the other 400 or so Breckinridge residents could receive television,
despite the fact that many parts of the country had been enjoying it for more than a decade.
Brown was even more enthusiastic about what television would bring to Breckinridge
in the future:
Our children will be educated and entertained just like they are everywhere else now.
The people will not frequent the Bars and Taverns like they used to do. Home life will
begin to get better here now. . . . I am looking forward to a better informed
community. A kinder more respectable community because no matter how little they
watch television some of the education and culture will rub off.
But despite the mayor’s newfound enjoyment of television and his observation that “the
children do not run the streets night and day like they used to,” Brown and other
Breckenridge residents feared they may not have television much longer. “Please Mr.
Craven,” Brown implored Federal Communications Commission (FCC) member T.A.M.
Craven, “do what you can to try to convince the commission that we need this Television just
like any other American citizen does.”1
Brown had reason to be concerned. Like thousands of others in mountainous western
states, he was able to watch television only because of so-called “booster” stations, which
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picked up very high frequency (VHF) signals from distant television stations and then rebroadcast them. The boosters normally consisted of an antenna located on a mountaintop or
other elevated location, a receiver, an amplifier, and a small transmitter to send the
strengthened signal back out over the air. The problem was that the FCC had never
authorized the booster stations, and by 1957 it was actively taking steps to shut them down.
Viewers like Brown, his fellow townspeople in Breckinridge, and thousands of others risked
losing a connection to the outside world that they had come to enjoy and rely on. “One would
have to be present to realize what the arrival of television really meant to this Valley,” wrote
a viewer from another isolated Colorado mountain town. “The morale of listeners is boosted
as they feel more on an even basis with the outside world.”2
Arising in the wake of the FCC’s 1952 Sixth Report and Order, which established
licensing procedures and an allocation plan for providing nationwide television service,
boosters were one of several new technologies designed to bring television to isolated and
lightly populated areas of the country that could not support their own local stations. Boosters
were inexpensive and relatively easy to build for someone with electronic knowhow, and thus
they proliferated almost organically in areas that lacked television service. “They were cheap
to install and maintain, requiring almost no operational oversight,” Parsons points out. “You
turned them on and left.” Wyoming Senator Gale McGee was oversimplifying things only a
bit when he cited one case where through “the genius of western initiative” a booster was
constructed “with a little baling wire and a home-made aerial and a pile of rocks on top of a
mountain.” Booster projects, which Le Duc notes brought “discernable if not studio-quality
pictures” to home viewers, were initiated and supported by enterprising tinkerers, informal
television “clubs,” appliance dealers, groups of ranchers, and even local governments. In
nearly all cases, the motive for building a booster station was not direct financial gain but
rather the desire to bring television service to others in a community.3
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But boosters ran afoul of the FCC because of their potential to create interference with
other radio and television services and their disruption of the commission’s overall allocation
plans as embodied in the Sixth Report and carried out through subsequent licensing
assignments. Boosters “constitute a serious interference threat,” FCC Chairman George
McConnaughey noted in 1956, “unless the equipment is carefully designed, properly installed
and closely supervised when in operation. These requirements of course are incompatible
with the remote, small community need for an inexpensive and reasonably simple system.”
But there was not agreement within the FCC on what to do about the boosters, and by the
time the commission got around to actually taking action, the stations had proliferated
throughout the West, creating an audience that had grown accustomed to television and was
not about to give it up easily. “You can’t take [television] service away from these people—
they’d shoot you,” Commissioner Robert E. Lee joked. The more immediate threat to the
FCC, however, was Congress. Each time the FCC moved to shut down the boosters, viewers
of booster signals and the governors of states where they lived were able to mobilize
members of Congress—particularly members of the Senate’s Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, which oversaw operation of the FCC—to pressure the commission to
back off. Ultimately, the FCC approved the operation of boosters—with some technical
stipulations—in 1960.4
Although a number of researchers have acknowledged the battle over boosters, most
have done so only tangentially, providing a broad overview of the controversy against the
backdrop of the development of cable television.5 This study examines the battle over VHF
boosters from the early 1950s to 1961. It shows that the FCC was passive and inconsistent in
its public pronouncements on boosters throughout the 1950s, and that booster operators—
although they had no corporate lobbying power behind them—were able to successfully
marshal members of Congress to keep nearly continual pressure on the FCC to approve their
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position. Western governors—especially Colorado’s Edwin Johnson—also played a key role
both in facilitating the operation of the booster stations and in pressuring the FCC both
directly and through members of their states’ congressional delegations. The study illustrates
the power that individual, largely unorganized viewers were able to bring to bear on the
policymaking process working through highly receptive state officials and congressional
representatives. It also provides a demonstration of how allocations issues at the FCC were
often resolved only after struggles between technocratic and nontechnocratic views on
policymaking, as noted by Slotten and others. The technocratic view, according to Slotten,
relied on “stubborn scientific facts” to determine policy, while the nontechnocratic position
sought to consider social and economic implications of policymaking as well.6
Television in the Early 1950s
The birth of commercial television in the United States is usually traced to the FCC’s
1945 allocation of 13 channels for the nascent technology in the VHF band. The allocation
delighted radio and electronics manufacturers, who hoped to cash in on pent-up consumer
demand for new products at the conclusion of World War II. RCA was in a particularly
enviable position, as it owned many of the patents necessary for VHF television production,
broadcasting and reception and—through its NBC network—also owned or had affiliations
with a large number of VHF stations already on the air experimentally. But others,
particularly CBS, had asked the commission to wait until broadcasting in the ultra-high
frequency (UHF) band could be perfected. Although CBS had its own motives—seeing UHF
as a way to promote its own color system that was incompatible with RCA’s standards—
almost all observers agreed that a major shortcoming of the VHF band was that it did not
offer enough channels for nationwide service. Even the FCC dropped hints that the VHF
allocation might be temporary in nature, but that was not enough to stall commercial interest
in VHF licenses.7
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In fact, by 1948 the demand for licenses was outstripping the ability of the VHF band
to accommodate them, and the commission’s ongoing efforts to make room for additional
stations led to interference problems. Thus, in September the FCC announced it would hold
off processing any further television license applications for six to nine months as it
determined how to proceed. What came to be known as the “freeze” ended up lasting for
nearly four years, as the FCC held several lengthy hearings at which it gathered thousands of
pages of testimony and engineering studies, faced congressional pressure and inquiries and a
general public increasingly clamoring for television. Finally, the commission ended the
freeze in April 1952 through its Sixth Report and Order, which continued television operation
in the existing VHF band and expanded it to an additional 70 UHF channels as well. “[T]he
effect was much like unplugging a pipe,” Sterling and Kittross note, as the television industry
“exploded,” growing to more than 500 stations by 1960. The Sixth Report and Order
“provided the last piece of a social and technical jigsaw puzzle,” Parsons contends. “By
stabilizing technical standards and reopening the spigot of licensing, it helped coalesce
decades of engineering, economic, and regulatory activity.”8
Still, the Sixth Report had the effect of maintaining the privileged position of VHF
stations at the expense of upstart UHF outlets. “[T]he FCC was unwilling to mount any
course of action that would seriously threaten the interests of the entrenched VHF television
industry,” William Boddy points out, and thus existing VHF licensees would not lose their
assignments, even if re-assigning VHF stations might have improved prospects for
nationwide service. A number of broadcast history scholars have noted that early UHF
stations lacked the range and picture quality of VHF stations, and early UHF receivers were
poorly designed compared to their VHF counterparts. For example, Armstrong points out that
FCC commissioner Frieda Hennock, in a partial dissent to the Sixth Report and Order,
foresaw that UHF operators would likely have to wait years for their signals to match the
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coverage of VHF stations’—if they ever did. The gap between VHF and UHF stations was
most apparent in cities where FCC station assignments intermixed UHF and VHF stations. In
these cities, UHF stations struggled to compete with their cross-town VHF counterparts,
usually ending up at a disadvantage when it came to network affiliations and advertising
revenue. Although the FCC had made provision for more than 1,300 UHF stations in the
Sixth Report, by 1960 there were only 75 on the air—more than 50 UHF broadcasters
actually returned their licenses during the 1950s.9
More broadly, the Sixth Report and ensuing licensing decisions failed to achieve the
FCC’s goals of national coverage and wide dispersion of stations. There were not enough
VHF channels available to provide national coverage, and the economic shortcomings of
UHF stations limited their coverage utility. Thus, the Sixth Report, Armstrong contends,
“helped lay the groundwork for a geography of local television signals . . . often poorly
matched to organic communities.” Similarly, Sterne maintains that“[t]he national television
infrastructure showed a distinct coastal and urban bias.” In the West, especially, the FCC
allocated television stations to geographic areas with too little population to support them—
thus, many were never built. These assignments were “empty gestures,” Le Duc notes,
“offering service on paper which could never be provided.” Thus, there were many areas,
especially in the West, that could not receive coverage directly from broadcast television
stations, even though potential viewers were in some cases in “fringe areas”— tantalizingly
close to places that could receive signals. It was in these fringe areas that so-called
community antenna television (CATV) operators began to proliferate, picking up distant
signals and then passing them to customers’ homes via cable. Boosters would come to
perform a similar function.10
The Development of Boosters
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It is difficult to know exactly when the first boosters went on the air; at least some
likely preceded the Sixth Report and Order. Indeed, the FCC had difficulty tracking down
booster stations and could never be fully certain of how many were in operation at any given
time. However, the commission had long maintained an interest in studying the potential of
unattended stations that could extend the range of traditional television outlets. “I do not
think television need stay in the millionaire class,” FCC Chairman Wayne Coy told the
National Association of Broadcasters in 1949. “[O]ne can build up a network very similar to
the network of a railroad system—major terminals, intermediate stations, short side spurs and
secondary lines.” In the early 1950s, the commission authorized several experimental, lowpower amplifier installations, and differing nomenclature developed depending on the how
they operated. Stations that received a VHF signal and then retransmitted it on the same VHF
frequency were referred to as boosters, while stations that received a VHF signal and then
broadcast on a different VHF or UHF frequency were called translators or satellites. The
earliest authorized experimental booster was installed by WSM in 1952; it picked up WSMTV’s signal about 70 miles from its Nashville location, and rebroadcast it to the small town
of Lawrenceburg, Tennessee. WSM’s president called the signals received in Lawrenceburg
“remarkably stable” and noted that the advantage of such booster operations was that they did
not use additional spectrum space since they operated on the same channel as the originating
station.11
Based on its Lawrenceburg experiment, WSM asked the FCC to authorize
commercial booster stations in 1953 with the understanding that they would be operated by
the main station licensee. Its request was bolstered by a petition signed by 1300 residents who
were enthusiastic about the television service WSM’s booster made possible. The FCC,
however, demurred, taking a less optimistic view. “The ‘booster’ station . . . is a two-edged
sword,” Chairman Rosel Hyde noted. “[W]hile it may result in improved reception in the
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immediate vicinity of the ‘booster’ station, it can also be a source of destructive interference
to normally satisfactory reception at other points.”12
Nonetheless, unauthorized boosters continued to proliferate throughout the 1950s.
The lure of television was so great in the early part of the decade that many people who lived
in areas that could not yet receive signals purchased televisions anyway, indicating the
“eagerness and expectation” of potential viewers, according to Parsons. That same eagerness
prompted residents of many small towns in the West without television to take matters into
their own hands, establishing groups to plan, build and operate boosters so that fellow
residents could receive television; it was “do-it-yourself on a massive scale,” observers noted.
Although a handful of boosters were established by owners of appliance stores or other
retailers who hoped to build a market for televisions, the majority were started by community
members with no other desire than to bring television into their homes and the homes of their
neighbors. Booster club members cleared paths through the brush and snow up the sides of
mountains, dug post holes, ran power lines, and built antennas and enclosures. The boosters
themselves were cobbled together by local electricians or tinkerers, and equipment was often
donated; one group in Washington even purchased surplus cabling from a decommissioned
Navy destroyer. The cost of these installations ranged from under a thousand dollars to a few
thousand dollars; in many cases clearing a path to the booster site presented the largest
expense. Once in operation, boosters cost as little as $50 a year to operate and maintain.13
Booster operations were funded for the most part by “passing the hat” among
community members. Groups placed newspaper ads, attended community meetings or
trudged door-to-door to collect money, usually between five and twenty-five dollars for the
initial installation, then a few dollars a year for operation and maintenance. In Utah, the state
legislature authorized setting up tax districts to fund television retransmission stations,
allowing some towns to fund boosters through their recreational programs. By 1959, there
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were an estimated 1,000 VHF boosters in operation, serving an audience believed to be in
excess of 675,000 people. Once these viewers actually had television, their attachment to it
only grew, especially since there was often very little else to do for entertainment in their
small and isolated towns. “Here normal, industrious, respectable citizens have invented a way
to bring to their lives for the first time all of the marvels of the outside world which the
urbanite has long taken for granted,” noted FCC commissioner Lee. A Wyoming booster
operator more succinctly noted that other than television, the only thing to do in his town was
hunt, fish, or “fight with the ‘missus’.”14
The Battle Begins
Beginning in 1953, the FCC shut down a handful of boosters in western states without
incident, but when it moved to shutter a booster in Bridgeport, Washington, it set in motion
events that would demonstrate both viewers’ commitment to their booster stations and those
viewers’ ability to mobilize political support. The booster, started by a local appliance store
owner, was financed by a group of about 80 people who paid about five dollars each to pick
up signals from two stations in Spokane. In October 1954, after receiving several complaints
about interference, the FCC persuaded the owner to shut the booster down and lock it up, but
soon after the owner reported that “persons unknown” had broken the lock and started the
station back up. This would happen several times in ensuing months—viewers of the booster
were apparently taking turns re-starting the booster each time it was shut down. Less
mischievous viewers worked to activate governors and members of Congress to the defense
of boosters more broadly.15
Within weeks of the FCC first shutting down the Bridgeport booster, Commissioner
Lee was summoned to Capitol Hill to meet with Washington’s senators, Warren Magnuson
and Henry Jackson. The senators listened to Lee’s concerns about interference, but were
insistent that the commission do something to maintain and improve television service to
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small towns. The senators’ pressure was enough to make the FCC back off the Bridgeport
operation, and in the meantime the commission authorized UHF translators as a means of
serving isolated areas.16 But the unauthorized boosters continued to proliferate, and they were
currently clearly illegal, so in April the FCC issued show cause orders to 23 booster operators
and held hearings in the towns where they operated. Based on the hearings, and visits to
several installations, FCC examiner J.D. Bond recommended the FCC assert no authority
over the boosters, contending they caused no objectionable interference to existing services
and that they “afford[ed] a larger and more effective use of TV broadcast channels.” Bond’s
report was greeted with immediate skepticism in the trade press, with TV Digest noting the
commission was “bound to reverse the decision—with a vengeance,” and quoting an
unnamed broadcast attorney as saying, “He’s simply repealing the Communications Act.”
The FCC’s General Counsel and Field Monitoring divisions agreed, charging Bond with
“arrogation to himself. . . of the policy making powers appropriate only in rule making
proceedings undertaken by the Commission.”17
Bond, however, was not the only one who questioned whether the FCC should even
take jurisdiction over booster operations. Such a view was not without precedent, as at this
time, the FCC had not yet asserted authority over CATV operations, noting that they were not
involved in radiating any electromagnetic signals through the air. Booster operators argued
that the signals radiated by their stations were so weak as to be insignificant and rarely if ever
crossed state lines. Clarence Dill, former head of the Senate Interstate Commerce Committee
and widely credited as the author of the Communications Acts of 1927 and 1934, also went to
bat for the Bridgeport booster, buttonholing individual commissioners in their offices to urge
them to withdraw their objections to the western installations. “They all insisted there was no
rule to license these peanut booster stations,” he said. “I told them to make a rule and that no
license should be necessary.”18
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It is not surprising that tensions built between booster and CATV operators, as both
sought to provide service to isolated rural areas. By 1958, in fact, as many as 700 CATV
systems were operating, providing service to an estimated 400,000 television sets. Most
CATV systems, however, were privately owned and driven by a profit motive. CATV service
was also much more expensive than boosters, due to the necessity of running cabling and
signal amplification to the home. CATV operators would come to represent the only
organized opposition to the boosters, as Parsons notes that “the competitive threat of TV
boosters. . . kept CATV industry owners and operators awake at night.” The CATV industry
generally had no problem with UHF translators—as they would require most viewers to
install expensive antennas and in some cases converters—but feared they would not be able
to compete with VHF boosters. “CATV systems became as afraid of the illegal boosters as
the broadcasters were of CATV,” noted E. Stratford Smith, general counsel for the National
Cable Television Association (NCTA). “It was just a matter of whose ox was being gored.”19
The majority of complaints about boosters to the FCC were lodged by CATV operators, and
there were several instances of apparent sabotage of booster stations, which booster operators
blamed on CATV interests. Some booster operators found jamming devices hidden near their
stations, while Wyoming Senator Gale McGee recounted “real cloak and dagger” activities
involving spying through windows, breaking locks and shooting booster connections with
high-powered rifles. In most cases, the identities of the perpetrators could not be proven, but
as one booster club president mused, “Who would benefit?” Milton Shapp, president of
Jerrold Electronics, which manufactured equipment for CATV operators, urged the FCC to
immediately shut down all boosters, contending that they were having a “chaotic effect upon
the entire FCC allocation plan.”20
In February 1956 the FCC came around to issuing a cease and desist order against the
Bridgeport booster. The commission’s decision expressed sympathy for booster viewers’
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desire to receive television service, but noted that this “does not alter the fact that the method
by which they have chosen to achieve their objective is illegal.” The booster’s operator
appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. circuit, which stayed the FCC’s order
pending its consideration of the case. Although the FCC touted its recently approved UHF
translators as a means of providing television service, western booster operators were
resistant as the equipment was more expensive, most potential viewers had VHF-only
televisions, and UHF signals, due to their location higher in the broadcasting spectrum, were
far less effective at traveling over the rugged landscape. “It was difficult to make a translator
that worked on those very high UHF channels with the technology of that time,” notes Byron
St. Clair, former president of the National Translator Association (NTA). “The UHF TV
receivers were also difficult to make work.”21
In the meantime, however, the FCC continued issuing orders against other boosters,
first in Washington and then in other western states. In June, the FCC ordered Walter R.
Webber of Steamboat Springs, Colorado, to shut down his booster. Webber, who owned a
local appliance store, had operated the booster since 1953, picking up KOA-TV and beaming
it to about 50 television homes in the small mining and ranching town. When he received the
FCC’s order to shut down, he dutifully complied; the town’s local newspaper, however,
railed against the “autocratic” FCC’s decision to “wield its bureaucratic power. . . to deprive
Steamboat Springs of television reception.” The local Chamber of Congress sent telegrams to
members of Colorado’s congressional delegation protesting the move, and also requested
help from the state’s governor, Edwin Johnson.22
“Big Ed” Steps In
“Big Ed” Johnson was no stranger to the FCC or to the broadcasting industry
generally. From 1937 to 1955 he served as one of Colorado’s U.S. Senators, and from 1949
to 1952 he was chairman of the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee. That
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committee was responsible for overseeing the activities of the FCC, and it was a
responsibility Johnson took quite seriously and at times carried out almost belligerently.
Broadcasting magazine observed that the Senate commerce committee “functioned as super
FCC” with Johnson at the helm, while TV Digest noted that Johnson gave the FCC “many
rough moments” as chair. His tenure coincided roughly with the span of the television freeze,
and he adamantly pushed the FCC to end the freeze as quickly as possible while urging that it
enact an allocation plan that would give UHF stations at least equal footing with VHF
stations. His impatience with the FCC during the freeze was based at least in part on the fact
that the state of Colorado at the time had no television stations; Denver, in fact, was the
largest American city without a station. He was also perhaps the most vocal proponent (other
than CBS itself) of Columbia’s color television system, which he saw as an antidote to the
power RCA enjoyed due to its patents in VHF and monochrome broadcasting. “Whenever
there’s a fire—or even a wisp of smoke—in broadcasting,” Broadcasting mused, “Sen. Big
Ed responds to the first alarm.”23
Rather than leave Colorado’s booster operators to the whims of the FCC or the
uncertainties of congressional pressure, Johnson decided to take matters into his own hands.
On August 3, with KOA’s blessing, he issued an executive order appointing Webber to his
“official Communications Staff” and granting his booster permission to operate. The order
noted that KOA “takes the public-spirited position that spreading its signal is a public service
obligation which it owes to the people,” and that the FCC, “without regard for the public
interest and for the cultural and educational needs and rights” had ordered the booster to be
shut down in an “unreasonable and unwarranted . . . abuse of federal authority.” Although the
order conditioned permission to operate on the assumption that the booster would not
interfere with any other electronic communication, in a Denver Post op-ed column, Johnson
said that there was no interference being caused by Webber’s booster, or any others in the
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state for that matter. “I have challenged the FCC and the whole cock-eyed world to show that
the booster operations. . . have, in any degree affected any radio, television or other electronic
signal any time, anywhere,” he wrote. “There will be no takers to that challenge! That is for
sure!”24
The trade press and FCC representatives greeted Johnson’s action with a combination
of bemusement and surprise at the governor’s chutzpah. Broadcasting noted that the former
“unofficial boss of the FCC” was “up to his old tricks” and recounted that an FCC staffer
“guffawed with unmitigated glee” when he was told of Johnson’s order. Noting that the FCC
was still awaiting resolution of the Bridgeport booster challenge in court, a member of the
commission’s legal team cautioned that “[u]ntil we know where we stand we certainly are not
going to tangle with Gov. Johnson.” Meanwhile, Dill applauded Johnson’s action, noting that
if he were still in the Senate he would propose a bill forcing the FCC to license boosters.25
In succeeding months, Johnson’s initial order was followed by several others,
authorizing at least 12 booster stations throughout the state. In a letter to FCC chairman
George McConnaughey, he urged the commission to be receptive to new methods of
television transmission that may not have been provided for in the commission’s initial
allocation plans:
The truth is that all methods short of the installation of TV stations, are still in the
experimental stage. These mountain areas should be encouraged to do what they can
to receive TV by means of the booster system. Such an experiment will prove
valuable as a guide to the FCC. There is much to be learned about serving small
communities.
McConnaughey’s reply noted that the commission was “deeply concerned” about areas
lacking television service and that the FCC had been studying ways to provide service to such
areas “in a manner which would not be destructive of the overall regulatory pattern. . . [and]
consistent with the best interests of the country as a whole.” UHF translators, McConnaughey
suggested, offered much greater potential for providing interference-free service, and the
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FCC was eager to see them put into operation. Finally, he offered that government action on
broadcasting spectrum “must be at the federal level” so that broadcasting would be “free of
the difficulties which confronted radio prior to adoption of the Radio Act of 1927,” referring
to the chaos in the AM band that had developed absent federal regulation in the 1920s.26
Similar sentiments were echoed by Commissioner Craven in response to a letter from
Howard Yates of the Colorado Chamber of Commerce. He noted that many booster stations
used equipment that was designed for CATV operations rather than terrestrial transmission
and thus was “never intended to be used with a radiating system.” He also said that boosters
were usually “left to run unattended, with apparently no thought having been given to the
hazard presented to the functioning of other stations and services.” He, too, suggested UHF
translators as a better solution. Yates apparently shared his correspondence with Johnson, as
the governor responded with a blistering letter to Craven denouncing his fixation on a
translators-only solution. “I’m disappointed that you seem stubbornly unwilling to try out the
‘booster’ system in the Rocky Mountain area,” he wrote. “What is wrong with two systems in
this big United States?” Congress intended the FCC to “operate in the public interest” and
“expected it to experiment and test and try to discover what system will give the best service
in the mountains,” he wrote. “Please stop shouting, ‘Thou shalt not’ and begin saying ‘Let’s
find out what is best.’” In a postscript to his letter, Johnson pointed out what he saw as the
hypocrisy of the FCC “go[ing] out of its way to slap the booster system down” while it “was
quiet as a little mouse” as CATV systems were “being installed everywhere.” “Why are you
picking on us mountain folks?” Johnson closed. “We are people, too.”27
Craven had returned to the FCC in the summer of 1956 after having been a
commissioner from 1937 to 1944. He came to be a commissioner by way of serving as the
FCC’s chief engineer, and during his first stint as a commissioner had established himself as
something of an “engineer’s engineer,” asserting, as Foust notes, “the primacy of technical
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principles in making allocation decisions.” Indeed, before returning to the commission from a
private engineering practice, Craven had given a presentation on the “Design, Construction
and Operation of Boosters, Translators and Satellites” at the 1955 National Association of
Radio and Television Broadcasters convention. Craven was also familiar with Johnson from
the Coloradoan’s time on the Interstate and Foreign Commerce committee. The
commissioner’s response to Johnson—unlike McConnaughey’s—presaged a greater
willingness to consider alternate efforts to expand television service to mountain
communities. “Personally, I shall take into consideration some of the very pertinent
statements contained in your letter,” he replied to Johnson. “I have long realized that, form
the standpoint of television, the Rocky Mountain area must be treated differently from other
areas of the country and that the Commission should be open-minded.” He invited Johnson to
come visit him the next time he was in Washington. “Perhaps a method can be worked out
which is not only practical but which also complies with the law,” he noted.28
In a further response to Johnson, McConnaughey in November pointed out that the
commission had issued several construction permits for UHF translator stations in the West,
including one in Cortez, Colorado, a desert outpost in the southwest corner of the state. He
noted that while currently UHF translators were “the only feasible method” for providing
television service to remote areas, there was “no inclination to consider the problem as
solved.” Indeed, he noted, further UHF installations were currently being tested in Nevada
and Washington. Johnson’s reply noted that he was skeptical of the possibilities of using
UHF, “but like a drowning man grasping at straws, I see great hope in the open minded
attitude contained in these lines.”29
Mobilizing the Boosters
The FCC took no action on boosters throughout the end of 1956 and the beginning of
1957 as it awaited resolution of the Bridgeport case. In the meantime, bills to authorize
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boosters were introduced in Congress and the Washington state legislature. Montana’s
governor eventually signed a bill authorizing boosters as well. In May 1957, the court
released its decision in the Bridgeport case, definitively acknowledging that boosters needed
FCC licenses to operate, but asserting that the commission should not force them off the air
in the absence of alternatives that would provide television service to isolated areas. Indeed,
the court noted that it was the duty of the FCC under the Communications Act to make
television signals available to all people of the United States. “The Commission might well
have been better advised to ignore the existence of booster stations such as this until the time
when it is prepared to deal with them on some basis more equitable than mere repression,”
noted one judge’s concurring opinion. As far as the FCC was concerned, however, it had
already established an alternative to boosters in its rulemaking authorizing UHF translators.
“We firmly believe that translators offer an excellent means for bringing service to
communities and areas without service,” the FCC contended, and pointed out that translator
applications were being processed “at a rapid rate.” Thus the commission rejected proposals
to authorize boosters at the end of June.30
After Johnson chose not to seek re-election, McNichols took over as Colorado
governor in 1957 and picked up right where Johnson had left off, quickly rounding up fellow
Western governors to oppose the FCC’s move, and asking the commission to open a new
rulemaking to consider authorization of boosters. Ed Craney, owner of a number of radio and
television stations in Montana, made arrangements for McNichols to meet with members of
the FCC in Washington. Craney was a close associate of Johnson and was also well known to
the commission as a leader of groups opposing clear channel AM stations. At the July 12
meeting, McNichols pleaded his case before several FCC staff members, including general
counsel and representatives of the broadcast bureau. Two weeks later, the FCC invited
comments on a proposal to authorize VHF boosters, as long as they caused no interference
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and were equipped to shut down automatically in the event of a malfunction. Industry
observers saw the FCC’s move as its final action toward eventually bringing the final curtain
down on boosters. TV Digest called the proposal a “put-up-or-shut-up” move toward the
boosters, while commission staff noted that the burden of proof would be entirely on booster
operators to prove they could operate without creating interference.31
Meanwhile, McNichols invited Craven and new FCC Chairman John C. Doerfer, who
had succeeded McConnaughey at the end of June, to visit Colorado so that they could see
some “typical” television systems in the West. Craven accepted the invitation and traveled to
Colorado in the fall of 1957, where he met with Johnson, McNichols, and representatives of
several western broadcasters. Upon his return, he made an impassioned plea to his fellow
commissioners to halt the booster inquiry and reverse what he called the commission’s
“precipitous, unduly rigorous, [and] unrealistic” stance against boosters. “The Commission
has plagued outstanding residents of many Western states with legal action,” he said, “instead
of recognizing the dire necessity which has inspired them to use their ingenuity to bring
television to outlying areas.” Craven recommended that the commission reclassify boosters as
“limited radiation devices,” and devise a simplified application and “moderate” standards for
equipment certification. The booster operator would be required to have a “qualified
engineer” make “periodical inspections” of the booster installation, and the licensee of the
station being re-transmitted by the booster would have to state that he or she was aware of the
booster and was “of the opinion” that it would not cause objectionable interference.32
Nonetheless, the commission proceeded with its booster inquiry, folding the issue into
a larger docket looking at television service to rural areas more generally. The commission
collected testimony throughout 1958, while the Senate Interstate and Foreign Commerce
Committee also held hearings on television service for smaller communities. In both venues,
the only organized opposition to the boosters’ cause came from CATV interests and a few
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individual stations. The vast majority of stations either encouraged the operation of boosters
or were ambivalent. The NCTA commissioned two technical studies citing the inadequacy of
booster signal quality and the potential for interference to other services. CATV
representatives also raised fears that boosters would create monopolies for large-market VHF
stations by extending their signals exclusively to remote areas. In a staff report on the Senate
committee’s study of rural television released at the end of December, counsel Kenneth Cox
urged the FCC to approve booster operation as part of an overall plan including CATV,
translators and satellite stations to provide rural service.33
Less than a week later, however, the FCC again denied requests to approve booster
operations, repeating its assertion that the role boosters played in providing remote television
service could be duplicated by legal UHF translators. The commission cited the potential for
interference to other television stations, as well as the possibility of interference with aircraft
and public safety services located in the “very congested VHF band.” Indeed, the FCC had
received a report of a plane that had followed a spurious beacon signal from a booster station,
and commissioners were afraid that a plane crash might be blamed on a booster “sooner or
later.” The decision carried a note of finality lacking in the commission’s previous two
findings against booster operations, as it gave existing operators 90 days to shut down, state
their intention to convert to UHF or face “necessary legal proceedings to bring to a halt the
unlicensed operations.” “It’s all over but the shouting,” mused TV Digest, “but there will be
some shouting.”34
Indeed, the FCC’s decision brought immediate reaction from Congress and western
statehouses. Several western senators criticized the FCC’s decision, noting its incongruence
with the Cox Report and Commissioner Craven’s earlier praise for boosters. Meanwhile,
McNichols summoned Doerfer to Denver, where aggrieved booster operators and state
officials vehemently protested the commission’s decision in what Broadcasting called a
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“turbulent rally.” Doerfer recounted the “chaos” created by the disorderly spread of booster
operations, comparing it to the situation in the AM radio band before the Federal Radio
Commission took over allocations in 1927. McNichols and booster operators contended that
the FCC’s inaction in the early to mid-1950s gave “tacit approval” to boosters. Doerfer
dutifully endured the grilling, but was eventually forced to admit “administrative failure,”
noting that the commission needed more money and better salaries so that they could
compete with the industry. Booster operators in attendance saw the chairman as weak and
unwilling to stand up to staff members. By the end of the meeting, Doerfer was urging
attendees to “get up steam and let Congress know” indicating that the Commission currently
lacked the needed authority to approve boosters.35
Upon arriving back in Washington, Doerfer directed the commission to a unanimous
decision extending the deadline for booster operators to comply with the FCC’s rules by
another 90 days. Still, congressional pressure mounted; by the end of the first session of
Congress, no fewer than 42 bills had been introduced urging approval of VHF booster
stations.36 Less than two weeks later, the FCC announced that it had instructed its staff to reconsider the legalization of boosters. Doerfer signaled to Senate Interstate and Foreign
Commerce Committee chair Warren Magnuson that the commission was ready to approve
boosters if the Communications Act could be revised to waive the requirement for a licensed
operator and to allow the FCC to authorize pre-existing stations. The abrupt about-face took
many industry observers by surprise, with Broadcasting noting that the “bedeviled”
commission had “double-clutched, shifted gears and swung into a U-turn on the heated vhf,
on-channel television booster road.” TV Digest called it “The Great Booster Rebellion of
1959.”37
But the booster proponents had seen enough about-faces by the commission to know
that they were not yet out of the woods, figuratively speaking. Indeed, immediately after
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Doerfer left the Denver meeting, booster operators re-convened in McNichols’ chambers to
discuss plans to organize and keep pressure on Congress and the commission. Urged on by
Craney, booster operators from 14 western states formed the National Television Repeater
Association, a non-profit entity with the goal of securing “the protection and improvement of
all TV Booster systems in the United States.” Although a number of state booster
organizations had already formed, the new association would actually collect dues and
marshal resources toward presenting the boosters’ case. To that end, it levied an assessment
of ten cents per television set on booster operators, and immediately made plans to send
resolutions to western congressional delegations and governors. Emboldened by the
“harmony and enthusiasm” booster operators displayed in Denver, state organizations
became more organized and combative as well. Montana’s repeater organization levied a fee
of one dollar per television set on its members “so we have a war chest to go thru [sic] with
this fight,” and vowed “that all clubs would act in unison to defy any shutdown order,” noting
that “an attack on one club would constitute an attack on all.” Johnson had encouraged
booster operators to organize as well, noting that the CATV interests were well ahead in this
regard. “These Community Antenna people have always had an inside relationship with the
FCC staff and some of the FCC [commissioners],” the former governor contended. “From the
very start they have fought by every means fair or foul [against] the booster stations.”38
The FCC continued in a holding pattern on boosters throughout 1959 and early 1960,
seemingly unwilling to stick its neck out without formal congressional backing.
Commissioners delayed rulemaking proceedings five times throughout 1959 and early 1960
as various bills to amend the Communications Act worked their way through Congress. In the
meantime, McNichols continued to pressure the commission to act. He acknowledged that the
boosters had been installed without commission authorization, but said that the public interest
would now be served by allowing them to continue operating. McNichols said that his office
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had received nearly 500 letters in favor of boosters, and pro-booster petitions signed by
nearly 6,000. “Television means a great deal to them,” he contended, “more, I would venture
to say, than to the people in cities who have other educational and recreational benefits
readily available.”39
Further hearings on boosters and CATV before the Senate Interstate and Foreign
Commerce Committee throughout the summer and fall of 1959 were mostly a replay of the
previous summer’s proceedings, with booster and CATV operators offering conflicting
technical studies on the effectiveness and interference potential of VHF boosters. Johnson,
again the point person for the booster operators, called on the FCC to adopt regulations
authorizing boosters as soon as possible so that the mountain communities depending on
them for television “may have the ugly cloud of legal uncertainty removed.” He blamed the
“well-paid community antenna organization” for thwarting efforts to legalize boosters, noting
that CATV interests had been “making life miserable” for nonprofit booster operators. In
September 1959, the Senate approved a bill (S.1886) that would amend the Communications
Act to provide for FCC approval of boosters. The bill was sent to the House, which took no
action on it during the 1959 session. Meanwhile, Johnson maintained that the FCC did not
need any changes to authorize the boosters, and Commissioner Lee, at his reappointment
hearings in May 1960, faced the brunt of Senator McGee’s frustration at the commission for
making “second or third or fourth class tv citizens” of Western viewers. Following the
hearings, Lee made a five-day trip through the West to inspect UHF translator and VHF
booster operations. In a report to Magnuson, he noted that he found several effective VHF
booster operations, and noted the enthusiasm of viewers for their TV signals. “As a practical
matter nobody, in my judgment, is going to take this service away from the people who
currently have it,” he contended. However, Lee said he believed that existing VHF boosters
should be authorized on a temporary basis with an eye toward converting to UHF.40
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Finally, in July S.1886 was approved by the House and promptly signed by President
Eisenhower. A week later, the FCC unanimously approved VHF booster operation, limiting
their power to 1 watt, and requiring that operators secure permission to re-broadcast from the
received station. The commission also required the boosters to avoid interference to full
service stations and broadcast on a different channel than they received, in effect making
them VHF translators under the commission’s definition. This was not a problem for most
booster operators, as the frequency change was relatively easy and inexpensive to make; in
fact many boosters were already changing the re-broadcast frequency because it was easier to
make the systems work using two different frequencies. The FCC did, however, find it
difficult to reach many booster operators to tell them to submit applications. Thus, the
commission sent a number of representatives to western states to gather booster operators
together to tell them about the news rules and help them come into compliance. By 1967,
more than a thousand formerly illegal booster stations had converted to translator operation
under the new FCC rules.41
Conclusion
The Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce returned West for a series
of hearings in early 1961, ostensibly to see how the new booster regulations were working.
However, the proceedings also took on the aura of a “victory lap” for western senators eager
to tout their role in getting boosters legalized. At one point, after a witness prompted applause
by congratulating the FCC and Congress for “coming up with a workable set of rules,”
Senator McGee interrupted “to be sure the applause goes to the right place.” “The FCC could
have done that many years ago,” he said. “We had to legislate for them, and they suddenly
found it possible to go to work as soon as the law was passed.” This was a sentiment that
many booster enthusiasts—especially Dill and Johnson—believed to be true. In their view,
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the FCC could have just authorized the boosters on its own in 1954 and saved a lot of
trouble.42
But for the FCC, the issue was not as clear-cut, as demonstrated by its series of fits
and starts throughout the mid to late 1950s. The commission’s vacillation can be understood
at least in part as a struggle between technocratic and nontechnocratic views on
policymaking. FCC policymaking, according to Slotten, often becomes “a prolonged period
of negotiation and compromise” between these competing views, with social and economic
implications usually being subsumed by supposed engineering imperatives as the commission
seeks to avoid controversy “by implementing decisions arrived at through the use of technical
reason.” The commission’s broadcast bureau feared that boosters would cause interference to
existing stations, further deteriorating a station assignment plan that had already shown
numerous shortcomings, especially when it came to providing service to far-flung rural and
mountainous regions. Most commissioners, at least early on, were persuaded by that fear and
thus refused to approve boosters. Craven initially opposed boosters, but his trip west in 1957
convinced him that boosters could operate effectively within sound engineering standards and
that they were providing a valuable service. He was the lone vote in favor of approving
boosters at the end of 1958.43
Craven evangelized for boosters among his fellow commissioners, assuring them with
his engineering expertise that booster technology had sufficiently developed to allow “safe”
operation from a technical standpoint. “At the beginning, they were against me,” he told the
Senate Communications Subcommittee in 1959. I think now there is a great possibility that
they have recognized what I saw in Colorado and. . . . I am not so pessimistic as to think that
the Commission won’t see daylight.” Doerfer, for one, was convinced by Craven’s
arguments, although he was no longer on the commission by the time it rendered its final
1960 decision. “Craven’s position is becoming sounder by the day,” noted Nick Zapple,
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counsel to the Senate commerce committee, in a January 1959 letter to Johnson. Indeed, the
Commission’s 1960 decision was unanimous, with Lee dissenting only on the issue of
whether any new boosters should be authorized and newly appointed commissioner Charles
King not participating. Thus Craven provided technocratic cover for other commissioners
who may have been reluctant to take a chance on approving boosters.44
However, Governor Johnson’s unilateral approval of boosters in his state must also be
acknowledged, for it extended the conversation about the technology long enough for a
technocratic defense to arise. Johnson’s willingness to defy the commission brought broader
attention to the issue, perhaps most importantly among his former colleagues in the Senate.
His boldness in turn emboldened other western politicians and the booster operators
themselves. Indeed, such an about-face on an issue by the FCC not precipitated by the actions
of one or more well-heeled industry factions is exceedingly rare. But FCC commissioners,
experiencing the public and Congressional outcry the mere threat of losing the boosters
brought, had to imagine that the situation would be exponentially worse if it actually
followed through and shut them down.45
Johnson encouraged and facilitated the organization of booster operators as a political
force because he had seen—and at times envied—the ability of entrenched interests to get
their way in the broadcasting industry during his tenure on the Senate Interstate and Foreign
Commerce Committee. During hearings in 1949, for example, he called representatives of the
clear channel AM stations “a well-entrenched, well financed, well staffed group who are
determined to have radio control in the United States.” Similarly, Johnson often pointed out
the power of CATV interests; “they are a powerful organization with millions invested and a
huge income,” he noted. For his part in helping the booster operators, in 1967 Johnson was
named the first honorary member of the Colorado Translator Association, which cited the
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former governor for taking the boosters “under his wing” and telling the commission “it
would have to sue the STATE before it could close any of these little boosters.”46
In ensuing years, the number of translators continued to grow and the FCC in fact
raised power limits and lessened some of the restrictions on their operation. As technology
continued to develop, VHF transmitting equipment became even more reliable and less likely
to cause interference. Today, VHF and UHF translators continue to supply programming to
isolated areas of the country, although informal clubs and other private operators have in
most cases been supplanted by local governments and television station operators. “Once we
overcame the initial problems in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the whole thing turned
around and the FCC became quite enthusiastic with how much good was being done with
translators,” notes St. Clair. “I absolutely give them credit for that.” There are no doubt many
westerners who can put their feet up, watch some college football and live “the life of Riley”
today due to the efforts of those who stepped up and fought during the nascent days of
booster television.47
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